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light of the distinction between fair-mindedness and neutrality, it seems 
more reasonable to leave open more possibilities. but, as Wainwright 
observes, one’s attitudes to opening or foreclosing possibilities may be 
influenced by how one weighs the different injunctions to believe the 
truth or to shun error (p. 91).
I hope to have conveyed some of richness of Wainwright’s discussion. 
Wainwright articulates a  view of reason according to which reason 
allows for more possibilities than the agnostic professes. one ongoing 
concern about the proliferation of possibilities – letting a  thousand 
flowers bloom – is the difficulty of comparative judgments of plausibility. 
If Wainwright’s view is correct then it seems to imply that reason is 
unable to significantly compare the plausibility of competing hypotheses 
in a non-question begging fashion. Yet, it may be that reason does not 
demand paying the cost of foreclosing possibilities.
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randal rauser’s Theology in Search of Foundation (ouP 2009, 
henceforth TSF) is the latest addition to the philosophical literature on 
the epistemology of theology. In recent years, there has been more and 
more talk about something called analytic theology. It is not perfectly 
clear what analytic theology is, but it seems appropriate to understand 
it as a movement in philosophical theology and philosophy of religion, 
which encourages and supports the use of analytic philosophical tools 
to treat questions that have traditionally been understood as theological 
rather than philosophical (e.g., Trinity, Christology, Incarnation, etc.). 
Furthermore, analytic theology, it seems, attempts to be a  reforming 
movement of theological method – an attempt to free theology from its 
‘‘continental captivity’’. As philosophers of religion go, most of the issues 
that TSF discusses are somewhat familiar, whereas for contemporary 
theologians, the topics might seem rather weird. If rauser’s approach 
to theology seems perplexing, the reader should consult michael rea’s 
opening essay to a recent edited volume Analytic Theology: New Essays 
in the Philosophy of Theology (2009).
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The basic question for TSF is the justification of theology. Does 
theology need to justify its propositions in front of the court of universal 
reason, independent of culture and tradition, or should theologians forget 
the search for universal foundation and simply settle for coherence of 
the Christian tradition? It might come as a surprise to philosophers but 
during the last 50 years theologians have debated these issues viscerally 
and whole theological schools have been formed on the basis of such 
debates (the so called post liberal theology and radical orthodoxy, 
for instance). What might be surprising to theologians is that analytic 
philosophers have developed distinct answers to such epistemological 
problems in the last 30 years.
TSF is more a  rigorous critique of various non-foundationalist or 
post-foundationalist approaches to theology rather than a  detailed 
exposition of an alternative view. rauser discusses the work of several 
contemporary theologians like Stanley Grenz, Nancey murphy, Kevin 
Vanhoozer and bruce marshall as well as non-foundationalist philoso-
phers such as richard rorty, W. V. o. Quine, Hilary Putnam and 
Donald Davidson on whom non-foundationalist theologians rely. For 
philosophers, the epistemological and metaphysical arguments that 
rauser discusses (e.g., theories of truth, language and reality, realism 
and anti-realism) are probably familiar. What might be less familiar is 
the context of the theological debate. For understanding the theological 
context of TSF, the reader should consult olli-Pekka Vainio’s Beyond 
Fideism (Ashgate, 2010) which provides an overview of the debates on 
(post)modern theological method.
According to rauser, the story of justifying theology goes 
something like this. before the 17th century and the advent of classical 
foundationalism, theology was not particularly concerned about 
justifying itself in any universal sense. After the reformation, the 
emergence of modern science and post-reformation political tumults 
in europe, a new standard for justification was formed. This was classical 
foundationalism. In rauser’s own words, classical foundationalism is 
the view that for all b’s (justified belief): ‘every b is either (1) properly 
basic – that is, b is either a self-evident intuition or an incorrigible sense 
experience – or (2) non-basic – that is, it is ultimately deduced or inferred 
from beliefs that are properly basic and the individual is aware of how 
b derives from properly basic belief.’ (p. 84) In other words, on classical 
foundationalism there are basic beliefs that need not be justified by other 
beliefs and our knowledge of the basic beliefs is infallible or  certain. 
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Non-basic beliefs are then justified on the basis of these infallible basic 
beliefs. Classical foundationalism is also internalistic in the sense that 
the epistemic subject has access to the evidence that justifies her basic 
beliefs.
Now, theology had two options: either take the route of John locke 
or various other enlightenment natural theologians, or abandon the 
justificatory project altogether and ground theology on something non-
epistemic, like religious experience or ethics (like Kant). As a side effect 
of the natural theological project, there were also attempts to ground 
theology on scriptural inerrancy. rauser concludes that all these attempts 
were failures. The natural theologians were unable to produce arguments 
that would satisfy the rigorous standard of classical foundationalism. 
Similarly, Kantian attempts to justify theology in terms of ethics had 
a tremendous price: God as something distinct from our experience was 
completely lost.
but why hold onto the classical foundationalist theory of justification 
in the first place? rauser is in agreement with contemporary non-
foundationalists that classical foundationalism should be abandoned. 
For one, most of the beliefs that seem certain to us on the surface are 
actually such that we can, at least in principle if not in practice, doubt. 
After Cartesian evil demons, it seems very difficult to ascribe absolute 
certainty to most beliefs outside logical and mathematical beliefs. The 
beliefs that matter to us the most (commonsense empirical beliefs and 
moral beliefs, for instance) fall prey to this lack of certainty.
Classical foundationalism is also challenged by the linguistic thesis 
according to which all experience is linguistically mediated. The classical 
foundationalist has to assume that there is some sort of pure, non-
conceptual experience (like in the sense-data theory) that will then justify 
our basic beliefs. but if our basic perceptions are grounded in concepts 
that are, in turn, shaped by our linguistic community, basic beliefs lose 
their incorrigible grounding in reality. our language becomes a kind of 
world in which we live without the possibility of ‘stepping outside our 
language to see how things really are’.
Finally, there is the famous argument that classical foundationalism 
is incoherent. remember that on classical foundationalism we have 
properly basic beliefs that are either a priori true or a posteriori infallible. 
Is the belief that classical foundationalism is true properly basic or not? 
It does seem to be either a priori self-evident nor a clear empirical truth. 
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If this is the case, belief in classical foundationalism itself is not justified 
given the classical foundationalist criteria for justification.
Such critiques of classical foundationalism lead to fallibilism, the 
view that there are no absolutely certain beliefs. As a  consequence, 
some philosophers (such as rorty, Quine and Davidson) and most 
theologians have abandoned foundationalism completely and attempted 
to ground theology on coherentism instead. on coherentism, there are 
no basic beliefs, since the view entails that only beliefs justify beliefs. on 
foundationalism, knowledge comes as structure in which basic beliefs 
are at the bottom. on coherentism, the most apt metaphor is a web in 
which each belief provides justification for another. Furthermore, most 
non-foundationalist theologians also accept the linguistic thesis, which 
usually leads to metaphysical anti-realism (no mind-independent world 
or we cannot say anything about it) and alethic agnosticism or anti-
realism (rejection of the correspondence theory of truth).
rauser identifies numerous problems in the non-foundationalist 
proposals. First, rauser challenges the thoroughgoing fallibilism of 
the non-foundationalist. This is because the claim that all beliefs are 
revisable in the light of new experiences leads to scepticism. He agrees 
with the non-foundationalists that most of our beliefs are indeed fallible, 
but he nevertheless maintains that there are some analytic (or synthetic 
a priori) truths that have to do with definitions, logic and mathematics. 
beliefs about such truths must be a priori, because there is nothing in 
our experience that justifies them. Why should we not abandon them 
then? Defenders of radical non-foundationalism, such as Quine, give no 
argument as to why we should hold onto the truth of, say, the law of 
non-contradiction. The conclusion rauser draws from this is that not 
every belief is accountable and revisable in the light of new experiences, 
as the non-foundationalist would have it. This does not mean that our 
knowledge of such analytic truths is infallible: we might make mistakes 
in accessing such truths but that does not mean that they are not there. 
There is something more to belief-formation than experience alone.
TSF also points out that coherentism is subject to various counter-
arguments. The problem is that coherence seems to be only one possible 
mark of true beliefs, not the only one. Imagine that you are working at 
your office, when you are suddenly hit in the head. Due to some strange 
misfiring in your brain, you still keep having the sensation of being in 
your office and believing that you see a computer in front of you. but 
in truth, you have actually been taken to the hospital and most of your 
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beliefs are false. In this case your beliefs would be coherent, but we 
would be extremely hesitant to say that they would be justified. Instead, 
we would say that they are not justified, because after the lighting strike 
and neural misfiring they have been produced in a mistaken manner, 
that is, in a  manner that is not reliable. So it seems that coherence 
might be one mark of truth-conduciveness, but neither a necessary nor 
a sufficient mark all by itself. Instead, the most important mark for truth 
and guideline for justification would be reliability of the belief-forming 
mechanism.
rauser also finds the linguistic thesis problematic. There is a  non 
sequitur deep in the argument for the linguistic thesis. The proponent 
of the thesis argues that since concepts are needed to talk about 
our experience of the world, the experiences themselves must be 
conceptually conditioned. but this does not follow. In the case of 
perceptual knowledge, I  am being presented by numerous facts about 
my environment. For example, all the different shades of colour on my 
computer display are presented to me at the same time. This does not 
mean, however, that we need to have corresponding colour concepts to 
have such experiences. In other words, we can experience the properties 
of our environment without grasping the associated concept. Such a view 
would entail a direct realist view of perception and other sources of basic 
beliefs (reason, memory): our beliefs that are composed of our basic 
concepts can be grounded directly in our basic perceivings. As such, 
the theory entails that there are concepts that have a natural, intrinsic 
connection with the properties exemplified by the world. Thus, language 
is not a world in which we live, a veil between the world and ourselves; 
it does not determine our experience of the world. Instead, language is 
a tool to conceptualize and talk about the world to which we all perceive.
TSF also defends a  strong metaphysical realism and claims that 
realism is not one theory among many but a necessary precondition for 
talking about truth, language and related concepts. Constitutive anti-
realism sees the ‘real word’ as a kind of undetermined flux that only takes 
determinate shape when we carve it into categories with our concepts. 
The problem is that incoherence looms: if the real world is constituted by 
our concepts, the claim that the world in constituted by our concepts is 
also constituted by our concepts and so on ad infinitum. TSF concludes 
that there are no viable alternatives to minimal metaphysical realism, 
that is, the thesis that there is a mind-independent world.
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rauser suggests an alternative to the problematic forms of non-
foundationalism: return to a  moderate foundationalism, hold onto 
a  robust realism about metaphysics and truth and reject the linguistic 
thesis. His model draws heavily on the epistemology of Alvin Plantinga 
and other reformed epistemologists, like William Alston.
Plantinga’s epistemology is foundationalist, because it holds onto 
the idea that there are beliefs that are not justified by other beliefs. 
The difference to classical foundationalism is that the justification of 
these basic beliefs is fallible and defeasible. This is because even basic 
beliefs are subject to various sorts of defeaters, that is, new evidence that 
removes the prima facie justification that basic beliefs have. Furthermore, 
Plantinga’s view entails that basic beliefs are products of properly 
functioning belief-forming systems and it is the trustworthiness of these 
systems that makes basic beliefs justified. Plantinga takes his cue from 
Thomas reid, a contemporary and opponent of locke. reid maintained 
that we have beliefs that are innocent until proven guilty, that is, they 
need no propositional evidence to be justified. It is enough that they 
are products of normally functioning belief-forming mechanisms 
(perception, reasoning, memory). Further, reid maintained that if we 
go on to demand propositional, non-circular evidence for the reliability 
of our basic belief-forming mechanisms, we end up in scepticism. This 
is the externalist component of Plantinga’s view: the epistemic subject is 
not required to have access to the propositional evidence (other beliefs) 
to be entitled to hold onto her basic beliefs.
Plantinga’s defence of externalism requires that our belief-forming 
faculties are, for the most part, reliable sources of beliefs, that is, they 
are truth-conducive in the correct circumstances. Plantinga understands 
reliability in terms of proper functioning. Proper functionalism of this 
kind entails that there is a design plan for our belief-forming faculties: 
our belief-forming faculties emerged according to the plan of a  being 
who can guarantee that they are truth-conducive, because the being 
itself is infallible (God). As is well known, this is the starting point of 
Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism that seeks to show 
the unreliability of our belief-forming mechanism, if they had evolved 
without God’s guidance. The latest version of the argument can be found 
from Plantinga’s Where the Conflict Really Lies: Science, Religion and 
Naturalism (ouP, 2011).
In his later work Warranted Christian Belief (ouP, 2000), Plantinga 
goes on to develop his Aquinas/Calvin model of theological beliefs. 
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on this view, basic theological claims derive from normally functioning 
cognitive systems in natural environments. There is a specific cognitive 
mechanism, sensus divinitatis that is designed for just this purpose. As 
such, properly basic Christian beliefs need no external warrant to be 
rational; theological claims need not be grounded in incorrigible a priori 
truths or indubitable empirical evidence. but this does not mean that 
evidence is completely irrelevant, since it can function as defeater to 
properly basic belief derived from sensus divinitatis.
In addition to Plantinga-style proper functionalism and metaphysical 
and alethic realism, rauser defends a  cognitive-propositional view of 
dogma. on the cognitive-propositional view, (most) doctrinal statements 
are statements about mind-independent reality and it is that reality that 
makes them true or false. In other words, doctrinal statements refer to 
matters of fact; they are not expressions of or references to basic religious 
experiences (experiential-expressivist model), nor are they rules of 
speaking and acting in Christian communities (cultural-linguistic 
model). The worry that accompanies the critiques of the cognitive-
propositional view is that it leads to a  static view of the dogma and 
leaves no room for development, especially in the context of ecumenical 
theology. Such criticisms, according to rauser, are misguided: like 
in critical realism in science, the fact that we understand propositions 
as referring to mind-independent realities does not mean that the 
propositions we now believe are the most truth-like that we could have.
I  often complain that the books that I  review are too long. TSF is 
a surprising exception: for once, I can say that the book under review was 
too short. many arguments in TSF, especially in the middle of the book 
discussing Quine and Putnam and others, are to the point but too dense. 
I wish rauser had used more pages to explain what these authors say and 
what his own critical points are. The arguments and counterarguments 
are there even now but they are discussed in a machine gun –like fashion 
that is rather difficult to follow, if the arguments are not already familiar 
to the reader. Also, the discussion of Plantinga’s epistemology is clear and 
accurate but does not really discuss the various well-known criticisms of 
Plantinga’s epistemology. If rauser wants to convince us that we should 
embark upon an exodus from the slavery of non-foundationalism to 
the Plantingian Promised land, he ought to have addressed at least the 
central objections to reformed epistemology.
Another thing that was missing from rauser’s book was a discussion 
on current internalist and evidentialist theories in philosophy of religion 
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and philosophical theology. There are surprisingly many who adopt an 
internalist theory of justification along the lines of richard Swinburne 
(Epistemic Justification, ouP, 2001) and reject the proper functionalism 
of Plantinga. The only time Swinburne is even mentioned in TSF 
is  in the context of enlightenment style natural theology, where he is 
swiftly brushed aside. Indeed, almost all theologians reject Swinburne-
style natural theology and even make fun of it. Nevertheless, rauser 
is too quick in identifying Swinburne-style natural theology with 
enlightenment natural theology: Swinburne’s model does not require 
there being incorrigible basic beliefs.
It is true that broadly speaking externalist approaches to knowledge are 
common in contemporary epistemology. According to a recent survey of 
philosophical views, around 40% of contemporary philosophers accept 
or lean towards externalism. However, Swinburne is hardly a  deviant 
in the context of contemporary philosophical epistemology in which 
bayesian and other broadly speaking internalist/evidentialist approaches 
are still very much alive. According to the same survey, internalism is 
either accepted or sympathized with by 26% of philosophers. In the 
last couple of years, there have been numerous debates about and 
defences of internalism by, for example, earl Conee & richard Feldman 
(Evidentialism, ouP, 2011) and several others (Trent Dougherty, ed., 
Evidentialism and Its Discontents, ouP, 2011). This applies to both 
atheists and theists: some atheists, like Herman Phillipse (God in an Age 
of Science, ouP, 2012) adopt an even more uncompromising internalism 
and evidentialism than Swinburne.
most philosophers of religion and philosophical theologians are 
already critical of non-foundationalist epistemologies and theological 
anti-realism – without any help from rauser. For them, the choice is 
between Swinburne-type internalism, Plantinga-style externalism, some 
sort of virtue epistemology or a non-standard combination thereof (e.g., 
Paul moser’s The Evidence for God: Religious Knowledge Reexamined, 
CuP, 2009). For this reason, I  would have liked to see rauser engage 
with internalism in philosophy of religion more.
Finally, I want to make my last critical point. As we have seen, rauser’s 
model relies heavily on reformed epistemology in general and Plantinga 
in particular. but Plantinga and his cohorts are not the only ones to defend 
moderate foundationalism. Here, I  think, rauser could have made his 
model more appealing by discussing other moderate foundationalist 
proposals. rauser often refers to robert Audi (Epistemology, routledge, 
191booK reVIeWS AND NoTICeS
2002) but does not mention that Audi has his own version of moderate 
foundationalism that is different from Plantinga’s. After the publication 
of TSF, Audi has developed his model in the context of theological 
epistemology in his Reason and Religious Commitment (ouP, 2011). 
Audi’s moderate foundationalism might be a  serious option for those 
who are not too keen on the proper functionalism of Plantinga.
In conclusion, I admit that although I am not sure whether I identify 
myself directly with the analytic theology movement, I  very much 
sympathize with the approach that it represents and find myself agreeing 
with most of what TSF says, especially with the critiques of various non-
foundationalist theologies and the accompanying robust theological 
realism. TSF splendidly identifies and analyzes the deep philosophical 
issues inherent in theological proposals. As for the attempt to ground 
theology in Plantinga-style proper functionalism, I  am not that sure. 
Despite my worries about rauser’s own solution and his limited discussion 
of current internalist proposals, I wholeheartedly recommend the book 
to theologians that are interested in the epistemology of theology as 
well as to philosophers that are thinking about theology and theological 
method. That being said, I would not direct theological and philosophical 
novices to the book, because of the density of its arguments and the need 
for extensive background knowledge for understanding it.
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Vincent brümmer, What Are We Doing When We Pray?: On Prayer 
and the Nature of Faith, Ashgate, 2008.
This is a  revised and expanded version of a book originally published 
by the author in 1984. Part I, which concerns prayer in the Christian 
tradition, takes up the first seven chapters of the book, and Part II, which 
concerns the nature of Christian faith, takes up the final three chapters. 
Here I  shall summarize briefly the contents of each chapter before 
making some general remarks about the audience to whom this book is 
most likely to be useful.
Chapter 1 outlines the questions to be discussed in the book, including 
some methodological ones about how to study the phenomenon of 
